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ABSTRACT
We address the problem of discovering communication links be-
tween applications in the popular Android mobile operating system,
an important problem for security and privacy in Android. Any
scalable static analysis in this complex setting is bound to produce
an excessive amount of false-positives, rendering it impractical. To
improve precision, we propose to augment static analysis with a
trained neural-network model that estimates the probability that
a communication link truly exists. We describe a neural-network
architecture that encodes abstractions of communicating objects
in two applications and estimates the probability with which a
link indeed exists. At the heart of our architecture are type-directed
encoders (tde), a general framework for elegantly constructing en-
coders of a compound data type by recursively composing encoders
for its constituent types. We evaluate our approach on a large cor-
pus of Android applications, and demonstrate that it achieves very
high accuracy. Further, we conduct thorough interpretability studies
to understand the internals of the learned neural networks.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
In Android, the popular mobile operating system, applications can
communicate with each other using an Android-specific message-
passing system called Inter-Component Communication (icc). Mis-
use and abuse of iccmay lead to several serious security vulnerabil-
ities, including theft of personal data as well as privilege-escalation
attacks [8, 12, 16, 47]. Indeed, researchers have discovered various
such instances [8]—a bus application that broadcasts gps location
to all other applications, an sms-spying application that is disguised
as a tip calculator, amongst others. Thus, it is important to detect
inter-component communication: Can component c communicate
with component d? (We say that c and d have a link.)
With the massive size of Android’s application market and the
complexity of the Android ecosystem and its applications, a sound
and scalable static analysis for link inference is bound to produce an
overwhelmingly large number of false-positive links. Realistically,
however, a security engineer needs to manually investigate mali-
cious links, and so we need to carefully prioritize their attention.
To address false positives in this setting, recently Octeau et al.
[33] presented primo, a hand-crafted probabilistic model that as-
signs probabilities to icc links inferred by static analysis, thus order-
ing links by how likely they are to be true positives. We see multiple
interrelated problems with primo’s methodology: First, the model is
manually crafted; constructing the model is a laborious, error-prone
process requiring deep expert domain knowledge in the intricacies
of Android applications, the icc system, and the static analysis at
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Figure 1: Overview of our approach
hand. Second, the model is specialized; hence, changes in the An-
droid programming framework—which is constantly evolving—or
the static analysis may render the model obsolete, requiring a new
expert-crafted model.
Model-Augmented Link Inference Our high-level goal is:
To automatically construct a probabilistic model
that augments static analysis, using minimal do-
main knowledge.
To achieve this, we view the link-inference problem through the
lens of machine learning. We make the observation that we can
categorize results of a static analysis into must and may categories:
links for which we are sure whether they exist or not (must links),
and others for which we are unsure (may links). We then utilize
must links to train a machine learning classifier, which we then
apply to approximate the likelihood of a may link being a true
positive. Figure 1 presents an overview of our proposed approach.
Link-Inference Neural Networks To enable machine learning
in our setting, we propose a custom neural-network architecture
targeting the link-inference problem, which we call link-inference
neural network (linn). The advantages of using a neural network for
this setting—and generally in machine learning—is to automatically
extract useful features of link artifacts (specifically, the addressing
mechanism in icc). We can train the network to encode the artifacts
into real-valued vectors that capture relevant features. This relieves
us from the arduous and brittle task of manual feature extraction,
which requires (i) expert domain knowledge and (ii) maintenance
in case of changes in Android icc or the used static analysis.
The key novelty of linns is what we call a type-directed encoder
(tde): a generic framework for constructing neural networks that
encode elements of some type τ into real-valued vectors. We use tdes
to encode abstractions of link artifacts produced by static analysis,
which are elements of some data type representing an abstract
domain. tdes exploit the inherent recursive structure of a data type:
We can construct an encoder for values of a compound data type by
recursively composing encoders for its constituent types. For instance,
if we want to encode elements of the type int × string, then we
compose an encoder of int and an encoder of string.
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We demonstrate how to construct encoders for a range of types,
including lists, sets, product types, and strings, resulting in a generic
approach. Our tde framework is parameterized by differentiable
functions, which can be instantiated using different neural-network
architectures. Depending on howwe instantiate our tde framework,
we can arrive at different encoders. At one extreme, we can use
tdes to simply treat a value of some data type as its serialized
value, and use a convolutional (cnn) or recurrent neural network
(rnn) to encode it; at the other extreme, we show how tdes can
be instantiated as a Tree-lstm [41], an advanced architecture that
maintains the tree-like structure of a value of a data type. This
allows us to systematically experiment with various encodings of
abstract states computed by static analysis.
Contributions We make the following contributions:
• Model-Augmented Link Inference (§3):We formalize and in-
vestigate the problem of augmenting a static analysis for Android
icc with an automatically learned model that assigns probabili-
ties to inferred links.
• Link-Inference NN Framework (§4): We present a custom
neural-network architecture, link-inference neural network (linn),
for augmenting a link inference static analysis . At the heart of
linns are type-directed encoders (tde), a framework that allows
us to construct encoder neural networks for a compound data
type by recursively composing encoders of its component types.
• Instantiations & Empirical Evaluation (§5): We implement
our approach using TensorFlow [1] and ic3 [35] and present
a thorough evaluation on a large corpus of 10,500 Android ap-
plications from the Google Play Store. We present multiple in-
stantiations of our tdes, ranging in complexity and architecture.
Our results demonstrate very high classification accuracy. Sig-
nificantly, our automated technique outperforms primo, which
relied on 6 to 9 months of manual model engineering.
• Interpretability Study (§6): To address the problem of opac-
ity of deep learning, we conduct a detailed interpretability in-
vestigation to explain the behavior of our models. Our results
provide strong evidence that our models learn to mimic the link-
resolution logic employed by the Android operating system.
2 ANDROID ICC: OVERVIEW & DEFINITIONS
We now (i) provide relevant background about Android icc, and
(ii) formally define intents, filters, and their static abstractions.
2.1 ICC Overview and Examples
Android applications are conceptually collections of components,
with each component designed to perform a specific task, such as
display a particular screen to the user or play music files. Applica-
tions can leverage the functionality of other applications through
the use of a sophisticated message-passing system, generally re-
ferred to as Inter-Component Communication (icc). To illustrate, say
an application developer desires the ability to dial a phone number.
Rather than code that functionality from scratch, the developer
can instead send a message requesting that some other application
handle the dialing process. Further, such messages are often generic,
i.e., not targeted at a specific application. The same communication
mechanism is also used to send messages within an application.
Consequently, any inter-component or inter-application program
analysis must first begin by computing the icc links.
Intents Figure 2a illustrates a simplified icc example with a ride-
sharing application (rideApp) that uses functionality of a map appli-
cation (mapApp) and an sms-messaging application (smsApp). Each
application comprises components (gray boxes), and arrows in the
figure represent potential links between components. icc is primar-
ily accomplished using intents. Intents are messages sent between
Android components. An intent can be either explicit or implicit.
The former specifies the target application and component; the
latter merely specifies the functionality it requires from its target.
Consider, for instance, the implicit intent 3 in Figure 2a; it re-
quests the action SEND (send an sms), which sends sms data. By
issuing this intent (Figure 2b top), rideApp is able to send a mes-
sage without having to worry about how this action is performed
and by whom.
Intent Filters Components that wish to receive implicit intents
have to declare intent filters (filters for short), which describe the
attributes of the intents that they are willing to receive (i.e., sub-
scribe to intents of those types). For instance, filter 2 in Figure 2a
specifies that smsApp can handle SEND and VIEW actions (Figure 2b
(bottom) shows the code declaring this filter). Therefore, when
the ride-sharing application issues an intent with a SEND action,
Android’s intent-resolution process matches it with smsApp, which
offers that functionality. Security and privacy issues arise, for in-
stance, when malicious applications are installed that intercept sms
messages by declaring that they also handle SEND actions [8, 11, 46].
2.2 Intents, Filters, and their Abstraction
We now formalize intents and filters. We use Σ∗ to denote the set
of all strings, and ω to denote an undefined value (null).
Definition 2.1 (Intents). An intent ι is a pair (act, cats), where:
• act ∈ Σ∗ ∪ {ω} is a string defining the action of ι, e.g., the string
"SEND" in Figure 2b (top), or the value ω.
• cats ∈ 2Σ∗ is a set of strings defining categories, which pro-
vide further information of how to run the intent. For instance,
"APP_BROWSER" means that the intent should be able to browse
the web; If an intent is created without providing categories, cats
is instantiated into the singleton set {"DEFAULT"}.
Practically, intents also contain the issuing component’s name as
well as data like a phone number, image, or email. We elide these
other fields because, based on our dataset, they provided little in-
formation: less than 10% of intents/filters have fields other than
actions and categories and even when they have them, the values
have few distinct possibilities. It is, however, conceivable that as we
investigate more applications, other fields will become important.
Definition 2.2 (Filters). A filter f is a tuple (acts, cats), where:
• acts ∈ 2Σ∗ is a set of strings defining actions a filter can perform.
• cats ∈ 2Σ∗ is a set of category strings (see Definition 2.1).
Like intents, filters also contain more attributes, but, for our pur-
poses, actions and categories are most relevant.
Semantics We will use I and F to denote the sets of all possible
intents and filters. We characterize an Android applicationA by the
rideApp Ride-Sharing Application
 smsApp SMS Application
mapApp Map Application
SearchActivity
MsgActivity
action: VIEW
dataScheme: geo
action: SEND
dataScheme: sms
MapActivity
actions: {VIEW}
dataScheme: geo
SendActivity
actions: {SEND, VIEW}
dataScheme: sms
targetApp: rideApp
targetComp: SearchActivity
ICC link 
targetApp: rideApp
targetComp MsgActivity
Intent 1 (implicit)
Intent 2 (explicit)
Intent 3 (implicit)
Intent 4 (explicit)
Filter 1
Filter 2
Application
Component
(a) icc example with three applications
public void sendImplicitIntent() {
Intent intent = new Intent();
intent.setAction("SEND");
msg = ... // contains phone # and msg
intent.setData(msg);
startActivity(intent);}
Code constructing and starting implicit intent
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="SEND"/>
<action android:name="VIEW"/>
<data android:scheme="sms"/>
<category android:name="DEFAULT"/>
</intent-filter>
Intent filter for a sms component
(b) Intent for sending an sms and associated filter
Figure 2: ICC Example
(potentially infinite) set of intents IA ⊆ I and filters FA ⊆ F it can
create—i.e., the collecting semantics of the application.
Let Y = {0, 1}, indicating whether a link exists (1) or not (0). We
use the matching function match : I × F → Y to denote an oracle
that, given an intent ι and filter f , determines whether (ι, f ) can
ever match at runtime—i.e., there is a link between them—following
the Android intent-resolution process. We refer to Octeau et al. [33]
for a formal definition of match.
Example 2.3. Consider the intent and filter described in Figure 2b.
The intent carries a SEND action, which matches one of the actions
specified in the filter. The msg in the intent it has an sms data scheme
so that it matches the filter data scheme. As for the category, the
Android api startActivity initializes the categories of the intent
to the set "DEFAULT". This then matches the filter’s "DEFAULT" cat-
egory. Thus, the intent and filter of Figure 2b match successfully.
Static Analysis We assume that we have a domain of abstract
intents and abstract filters, denoted I# and F #, respectively. Semanti-
cally, each abstract intent ι# ∈ I# denotes a (potentially infinite) set
of intents in I , and the same analogously holds for abstract filters.
We assume that we have a static analysis that, given an application
A, returns a set of abstract intents and filters, I#A and F
#
A. These
overapproximate the set of possible intents and filters. Formally:
for every ι ∈ IA, there exists an abstract intent ι# ∈ I#A such that
ι ∈ ι#; and analogously for filters.
Provided with an abstract intent and filter—say, from two differ-
ent apps—the static analysis employs an abstract matching function
match# : I# × F # → {0, 1,⊤},
which determines that there must be link between them (value 1),
there must be no link (value 0), or maybe there is a link (value ⊤).
The more imprecise the abstractions ι#, f # are, the more likely that
match# fails to provide a definitive must answer.
We employ the ic3 [35] tool for computing abstract intents and
filters, and the primo tool [33] for abstract matching, which re-
ports must or may results. An abstract intent ι# computed by ic3
has the same representation as an intent: it is a tuple (act, cats),
except that strings in act and cats are interpreted as regular ex-
pressions. Therefore, ι# represents a set of intents, one for each
combination of strings that matches the regular expressions. The
same holds for filters. For example, an abstract intent can be the
tuple ("(.*)SEND", {"DEFAULT"}). This represents an infinite set of
intents where the action string has the suffix "SEND".
3 MODEL-AUGMENTED LINK INFERENCE
We now view link inference as a classification problem.
A Probabilistic View of Link Inference Recall that I# is the set
of abstract intents, F # is the set of abstract filters, and Y = {0, 1}
indicates whether a link exists. We can construct a classifier (a
function) h : I#×F # → [0, 1], which, given an abstract intent ι# and
filter f #, h(ι#, f #) indicates the probability that a link exists (the
probability that a link does not exist is 1−h(ι#, f #)). In other words,
h(ι#, f #) is used to estimate the conditional probability that y = 1
(link exists) given that the intent is ι# and the filter is f #—that is, h
estimates the conditional probability p(y | ι#, f #).
There are many classifiers used in practice (e.g. logistic regres-
sion). We focus on neural networks, as we can use them to automat-
ically address the non-trivial task of encoding intents and filters as
vectors of real values—a process known as feature extraction.
Training via Static Analysis The two important questions that
arise in this context are: (i) how do we obtain training data, and
(ii) how do we represent intents and filters in our classifier?
• Training data: We make the observation that the results of a
sound static analysis can infer definite labels—must information—
of the intents and filters it is provided. Thus, we can (i) randomly
sample applications from the Android market, and (ii) use static
analysis to construct a training set D ⊆ (I# × F #) × Y :
D = {⟨(ι#1, f #1 ),y1⟩, . . . , ⟨(ι#n , f #n ),yn⟩}
comprised of intents and filters for which we know the label y
with absolute certainty because they are in the must category
for the static analysis. To summarize, we use static analysis as the
oracle that labels the data for us.
• Representation: For a typical machine-learning task, the input
to the classifier is a vector of real values (i.e. the set of features).
Our abstract intents, for example, are elements of type (Σ∗ ∪
{ω})× 2Σ∗ . So, the key question is how can we transform elements
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Figure 3: High-level architecture of linns
of such complex type into a vector of real values? In §4, we present
a general framework for taking some compound data type and
training a neural network to encode it as a real-valued vector.
We call the technique type-directed encoding.
Augmenting Static Analysis Once we have trained a model h :
I#×F # → [0, 1], we can compose it with the results of static analysis
to construct a quantitative abstract matching function:
qmatch(ι#, f #) =

0 match(ι#, f #) = 0
1 match(ι#, f #) = 1
h(ι#, f #) match(ι#, f #) = ⊤
where, when static analysis reports a may result, instead of simply
returning ⊤, we return the probability estimated by the model h.
4 LINK-INFERENCE NEURAL NETWORKS
We now present our link-inference neural network (linn) framework
and formalize its components. Our goal is to take an abstract intent
and filter, (ι#, f #), representing a may link, and estimate the proba-
bility that the link is a true positive. linns are designed to do that.
A linn is composed of two primary components (see Figure 3):
• Type-directed encoders (tde): A linn contains two different
type-directed encoders, which are functions mapping an abstract
intent or filter to a vector of real numbers. Essentially, the encoder
acts as a feature extractor, distilling and summarizing relevant
parts of an intent/filter as a real-valued vector. Type-directed en-
coders are compositions of differentiable functions, which can
be instantiated using various neural-network architectures.
• Classification layers: The classification layers take the encoded
intent and filter and return a probability that there is a link
between intent ι and filter f . The classification layer we use is a
deep neural network—multilayer perceptrons (mlp).
Once we have an encoding of intents and filters inRn , we can use
any other classification technique, e.g., logistic regression. How-
ever, we use neural networks because we can train the encoders
and the classifier simultaneously (joint training).
Before presenting tdes in §4.3, we (i) present relevant machine-
learning background (§4.1) and (ii) describe neural-network archi-
tectures we can use in tdes (§4.2-4.2). For a detailed exposition of
neural networks, refer to Goodfellow et al. [14].
4.1 Machine Learning Basics
We begin by defining the machine learning problem we aim to solve
and set the notation for the rest of this section.
Machine Learning Problem Recall that our training data D is
a set {⟨(ι#i , f #i ),yi ⟩}i , where yi is the label for intent ι#i and filter
f #i . Let H be a hypothesis space—a set of possible classifiers. A loss
function ℓ : H × Z → R defines how far the prediction of H is
on some item z ∈ (I# × F #) × Y . Our goal is to minimize the loss
function over the training set; we thus define the following quantity:
LD (h) = 1n
∑n
j=1 ℓ(h, ⟨(ι#j , f #j ),yj ⟩).
Finally, we solve argminh∈H LD (h), which results in a hypothe-
sis h ∈ H that minimizes LD (h). This is typically performed using
an optimization algorithm like stochastic gradient descent (sgd).
Notation In what follows, we use x ,y, z,w, . . . to denote column
vectors inRn . We will use x ,y,z,w, . . . to denote matrices inRn×m ,
where x i will denote the ith column vector in matrix x .
Neural Networks Neural networks are transformations described
in the form of matrix operations and pointwise operations. In gen-
eral, a neural network y = д(x ;w) maps input x to output y with
some vectorw called the parameters of the neural network, which
are to be optimized to minimize the loss function. There are also
other parameterizable aspects of a neural network, such as the di-
mensions of input and output, which need to be determined before
training. Those are called hyperparameters.
4.2 Overview of Neural Architectures
We now briefly describe a number of neural network architectures
we can use in tdes.
Multilayer Perceptrons (mlp) Multilayer perceptrons are the
canonical deep neural networks. They are compositions of multiple
fully connected layers, which are functions of the form fc(x ;w,b) =
a(w⊤x + b) : Rm → Rn , where w and b are parameters,m is the
input dimension, n is the output dimension, and a is a pointwise
activation function. Some common activation functions include
sigmoid and rectified linear unit (ReLU), respectively: σ (x) = 11+e−x
and relu(x) =max(0,x).
Convolutional Neural Networks (cnn) cnns were originally
developed for image recognition, and have recently been success-
fully applied to natural language processing [21, 22]. cnns are fast
to train (compared to rnns; see below) and good at capturing shift
invariant features, inspiring our usage here for encoding strings. In
our setting, we use 1-dimensional cnns with global pooling, trans-
forming a sequence of vectors into a single vector, i.e., Rn×l → Rk ,
where l is the length of the input and k is the number of kernels.
Kernels are functions Rn×s → R of size s that are applied to every
contiguous sequence of length s of the input. A global pooling func-
tion (e.g., max) then summarizes the outputs of each kernel into a
single number. We use cnns by Kim et al. [22] for encoding natural
language, where kernels have variable size.
RecurrentNeuralNetworks (rnn) rnns are effective at handling
sequential data (e.g., text) by recursively applying a neural network
unit to each element in the sequence. An rnn unit is a network map-
ping an input and hidden state pair at position i − 1 in the sequence
to the hidden state at position i , that is, rnn_unit : x i ,hi−1 7→ hi .
The hidden state hi ∈ Rn can be viewed as a summary of the se-
quence seen so far. Given a sequence x ∈ Rm×l of length l , we can
calculate the final hidden state by applying the rnn unit at each
step. Thus, we view an rnn as a transformation in Rm×l → Rn .
Practically, we use a long short-term memory network (lstm) [20],
an rnn designed to handle long-term dependencies in a sequence.
Recursive Neural Networks Analogous to rnns, recursive neural
networks apply the same unit over recursive structures like trees. A
recursive unit takes input xv associated with tree node v as well as
all the hidden states hC(v) ∈ Rn×|C(v) | from its children C(v), and
computes the hidden state hv of the current node. Intuitively, the
vector hv summarizes the subtree rooted at v .
One popular recursive architecture is Tree-lstm [41]. Adapted
from lstms, a Tree-lstm unit can take possibly multiple states from
the children of a node in the tree. For trees with a fixed number k of
children per node and/or the order of children matters, we can have
dedicated weights for each child. This is called a k-ary Tree-lstm
unit, a function in Rn×k → Rn . For trees with variable number
of children per node and/or the order of children does not matter,
we can operate over the sum of children states. This is called a
Child-Sum Tree-lstm unit, a function in Rn×|C(v) | → Rn for node
v . Refer to Tai et al. [41, Section 3] for details.
4.3 Type-Directed Encoders
We are ready to describe how we construct type-directed encoders
(tde). A tde takes an abstract intent or filter and turns it into a real-
valued vector of size n. As we shall see, however, our construction
is generic: we can take some type τ and construct a tde for τ by
recursively constructing encoders for constituents of τ . Consider,
e.g., a product type comprised of an integer and a string. An encoder
for such type takes a pair of an integer and a string and returns
a vector in Rn . To construct such an encoder, we compose two
separate encoders, one for integers and one for strings.
Formal Definition Formally, an encoder for elements of type τ is
a function д : τ → Rn mapping values of type τ into vector space
Rn . For element a ∈ τ , д(a) is called the encoding of a by д. Integer
n is the dimension of the encoding, denoted by dim(д) = n.
The dimension n of an encoder is a fixed parameter that we
have to choose—a hyperparameter. The intuition is that the larger
n is, the encoder can potentially capture more information, but will
require more data to train.
Encoder Construction Framework In what follows, we begin
by describing encoders for base types: reals and characters. Then,
we describe encoders for lists, sets, product types, and sum types. In
our setting of icc analysis, these types appear in, for example, the
intent action field, which is a list of characters (string) or null, and
filter actions, which are sets of lists of characters (sets of strings).
The inference rules in Figure 4 describe how an encoder д can
be constructed for some type τ , denoted by д ▶ τ . Table 1 lists
the parameters used by a tde, which are differentiable functions;
the table also lists possible instantiations. Depending on how we
instantiate these functions, we arrive at different encodersNote that
tdes are compositions of differentiable functions; this is important
since we can jointly train them along with the classifier in linns.
e-real
λx . x ▶ R
enumEnc : τc → Rn
e-cat
enumEnc ▶ τc
д : τ → Rn
flat : L(Rn ) → Rm
e-list
λx . flat(map д x ) ▶ L(τ )
д : τ → Rn
aggr : S(Rn ) → Rm
e-set
λx . aggr(map д x ) ▶ S(τ )
д1 : τ1 → Rn д2 : τ2 → Rm comb : Rn × Rm → Rl
e-prod
λ(x, y). comb(д1(x ), д2(y)) ▶ τ1 × τ2
д1 : τ1 → Rn д2 : τ2 → Rn
e-sum
λx . if x ∈ τ1 then д1(x ) else д2(x ) ▶ τ1 + τ2
τc is a categorical type, e.g., characters.
Figure 4: Rules for type-directed encoding. Representations of func-
tions enumEnc, flat, aggr, comb, are in Table 1.
Table 1: Types of differentiable functions used intdes (Figure 4) and
possible practical instantiations
Encoder Type Possible differentiable implementations
enumEnc Σ→ Rl Trainable lookup table (embedding layer)
flat L(Rn ) → Rm cnn / lstm
aggr S(Rn ) → Rm sum / Child-sum Tree-lstm unit
comb Rn × Rm → Rl Single-layer mlp / binary Tree-lstm unit
Example 4.1. Throughout our exposition, we shall use the run-
ning example of encoding an abstract intent ι#. We will use L(τ ) to
denote the type of lists of elements in type τ , and S(τ ) to denote
sets of elements in τ . We use Ω to denote the singleton type that
only contains the undefined value ω.
With this formalism, the type of an abstract intent is (L(Σ) +
Ω) × S(L(Σ)). (L(Σ) + Ω) is a sum type, denoting that an action is
either a string (list of characters) or null. Type S(L(Σ)) is that of
categories of an abstract intent—sets of strings. The product (×)
of action and categories comprises an abstract intent. Following
Figure 4, the construction proceeds in a bottom-up fashion, starting
with encoders for base types and proceeding upwards. For instance,
to construct an encoder for L(Σ), we first require an encoder д for
type Σ, as defined by the rule e-list.
Encoding Base Types
We start with encoders for base types.
Numbers Since real numbers are already unary vectors, we can
simply use the identity function (λx . x) to encode elements of R.
This is formalized in the rule e-real. (The same applies to integers.)
Categorical types (chars) We now consider types τc with finitely
many values, e.g., ascii characters, Booleans and user-defined enu-
merated types. One common encoding is using a lookup table. Sup-
pose there are k possible values of type τc , namely, a1,a2, . . . ,ak .
The lookup table is often denoted as a matrixw ∈ Rn×k , where n
is the dimension of the resulting encoding. The encoding for value
aj is simply the jth columnw j of the matrixw .
As formalized in rule e-cat in Figure 4, we encode categorical
types using an enumEnc function, which we implement as a lookup
table whose elementsw are learned automatically.1
1 One-hot encoding is a special case of the lookup table, whereW = Ik×k .
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Example 4.2. In our example, we need two instances of enumEnc:
enumEncΣ for encoding characters in Σ, and enumEncΩ for encod-
ing the null type Ω.
Encoding Compound Types
We now switch attention to encoding compound types.
Lists As formalized in rule e-list, to generate an encoder for L(τ ),
we require an encoder for type τ . Given an encoder д : τ → Rn ,
we can apply it to every element of the list, thus resulting in a list
of type L(Rn ). Then, using the function flat : L(Rn ) → Rm , we can
transform L(Rn ) to a vector Rm . As we indicate in Table 1, we use
a cnn or an lstm to learn the function flat during training.
Example 4.3. To encode strings L(Σ) (actions), we construct
strEnc = λx . flat(map enumEncΣ x) ▶ L(Σ)
where enumEncΣ is the encoder we construct for characters, and
map is the standard list combinator that applies enumEncΣ to every
element in list x , resulting in a new list.
Sets Rule e-set generates an encoder for type S(τ ), in an analogous
manner to e-list. Given an encoder д : τ → Rn , we can apply it
to every element of the set, thus resulting in a set of type S(Rn ).
Then, using the aggregation function aggr : S(Rn ) → Rm , we can
transform S(Rn ) to a vectorRm . As shown in Table 1, we can simply
set aggr to be the sum of all vectors in the set, or use a Child-sum
Tree-lstm unit to pool all elements of a set.
Note that our treatment of sets differs from lists: We do not
use cnns or lstms to encode sets, since, unlike lists, sets have no
ordering on elements to be exploited by a cnn or an lstm.
Example 4.4. Categories of an intent are of type S(L(Σ)). Given
an encoder strEnc for L(Σ), we construct the encoder
catsEnc = λx . aggr(map strEnc x) ▶ S(L(Σ))
where map here applies strEnc to every element in set x .
Sum Types We now consider sum (union) types τ1 + τ2, where a
variable can take values in τ1 or τ2. Rule e-sum generates an encoder
for type τ1 + τ2; it assumes that we have two encoders, д1 and д2,
for τ1 and τ2, respectively. Both encoders have to map vectors of
the same size n. e-sum generates an encoder from τ1+τ2 to a vector
in Rn . If a variable x is of type τ1, it is encoded as the vector д1(x).
Alternatively, if x is of type τ2, it is encoded as the vector д2(x).
Example 4.5. The action field of an abstract intent is a sum type
L(Σ) + Ω; We construct an encoder for this as follows:
actEnc = λx . ifx ∈ L(Σ) then strEnc(x) else enumEncΩ(x) ▶ L(Σ)+Ω
Product Types We now consider product types of the form τ1×τ2.
Rule e-prod generates an encoder for type τ1 × τ2; as with e-sum,
it assumes that we have two encoders, д1 and д2, one for type τ1
and another for τ2. Additionally, we assume we have a function
comb : Rn × Rm → Rl . The encoder for τ1 × τ2 therefore encodes
type τ1 using д1, encodes type τ2 using д2, and then summarizes
the two vectors produced by д1 and д2 as a single vector in Rl . This
can be performed using an mlp, or using a binary Tree-lstm unit.
Essentially, we view the the product type as a tree node with 2
children; so we can summarize the children using a Tree-lstm unit.
Table 2: Instantiations of tde parameters
tde parameters
Instantiation Type enumEnc flat aggr comb
str-rnn L(Σ) lookup rnn - -
str-cnn L(Σ) lookup cnn - -
typed-simple full lookup cnn sum 1-layer perceptron
typed-tree full lookup cnn Tree-lstm Tree-lstm
*lookup stands for lookup table, as described in §4.3 and Table 1.
Table 3: Choices of hyperparameters
Hyperparameter Choice
Lookup table dimension 16
cnn
kernel sizes ⟨1, 3, 5, 7⟩
kernel counts ⟨8, 16, 32, 64⟩
activation relu
pooling max
rnn (lstm) hidden size 128
1-layer perceptron dimensions 64activation relu
Multilayer perceptron dimensions ⟨16, 1⟩activation ⟨relu, σ ⟩
Example 4.6. Finally, to encode an intent, we encode the product
type of an action and categories:
λ(a, c). comb(actEnc(a), catsEnc(b)) ▶ (L(Σ) + Ω) × S(L(Σ))
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We now describe an implementation of our technique with various
instantiations and present a thorough evaluation. We designed our
evaluation to answer the following two questions:
Q1: Accuracy Are linns effective at predicting may links, and
what are the best instantiations of tdes for our task?
Q2: Efficiency What is the runtime performance of model train-
ing and link prediction (inference)?
We begin by summarizing our findings:
(1) The best instantiation of tdes labels may links with an
F1 score of 0.931, an area under roc curve of 0.991, and a
Kruskal’s γ of 0.992. All these metrics indicate high accuracy.
(2) All instantiations complete training within ∼20min. All in-
stantiations take <0.2ms to label a link, except the instantia-
tion using rnns, which takes 2.2ms per link.
Instantiations To answer our research questions, we experiment
with 4 different instantiations of tdes, outlined in Table 2, which
are designed to vary in model sophistication, from simplest to
most complex. In the simplest instantiations, str-rnn and str-cnn,
we serialize abstract intents and filters as strings (L(Σ)) and use
rnns and cnns for encoding. In the more complex instantiations,
typed-simple and typed-tree, we maintain the full constituent types
for intents and filters, as illustrated in §4.3. The typed-simple in-
stantiatition uses the simplest choices for aggr and comb—sum of
all elements and a single-layer neural network, respectively. The
typed-tree instantiations uses Child-Sum and binary Tree-lstm
units instead.
Hyperparameters Table 3 summarizes the choice of hyperparam-
eters. We choose the embedding dimension and the range of kernel
sizes following a similar choice as in Kim et al. [22]. We choose only
odd sizes for alignment consideration. We choose relu for all acti-
vations as it is both effective in prediction and efficient in training.
For global pooling in cnns,max is used as we are only interested in
the existence of a pattern, rather than its frequencies. The hidden
size of rnns is set close to the output size of cnns, so we could
fairly compare the capability of the two architectures. Tree-lstms
used in our instantiations require no hyperparameterization, as the
hidden size is fixed to the output size of the string encoder.
Implementation We have implemented our instantiations in
Python using Keras [9] with the TensorFlow [1] backend. We chose
cross entropy as our loss function and RMSprop [42], a variation of
stochastic gradient descent (sgd), for optimization. All experiments
were performed on a machine with an Intel Core i7-6700 (3.4 GHz)
CPU, 32GB memory, 1TB SSD, and Nvidia GeForce GTX 970 GPU.
The linn was trained and tested on the GPU.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Corpus We used the primo [33] corpus, consisting of 10,500 An-
droid applications from Google Play. For static analysis, we used
ic3 [34] combined with primo’s abstract matching procedure. This
combination provides a definitive must/may label to pairs of ab-
stract intents and filters.
Simulating Imprecision The challenge with setting up the train-
ing and test data is that we do not know the ground truth label of
may links. To work around that, we adopt the ingenious approach
of Octeau et al. [33], who construct synthetic may links from must
links by instilling imprecisions in abstract intents and filters. This
results in a set of may links for which we know the label. Formally,
to add imprecision to an abstract intent ι#, we transform it into
a weaker abstract value ι#w such that ι# ⊆ ι#w . Intuitively, adding
imprecisions involves adding regular expressions, like ".*" into,
e.g., action strings.
Following [33], we use the empirical distribution of impreci-
sion observed in the original abstract intents (filters) to guide the
imprecision simulation process. Specifically, we distinguish the
different types of imprecision (full or partial, and by each field)
and calculate the empirical probability for each of them as they
appear in our data. These probabilities are then used to introduce
respective imprecisions in the intents and filters. Note that the in-
troduction of imprecision does not necessarily convert a must link
into a may link—since even if we weaken an abstract intent, the
abstract matching process may still detect its label definitively.
Sampling and Balancing We train the model on a sampled subset
of links, as the number of links is quadratic in the number of intents
and filters and training is costly (we have 3,856 intents and 37,217
filters, leading to over 100 million links). Sampling may result in
loss of information; however, as we show, our models perform well.
Another important aspect of sampling is balancing. Neural net-
works are sensitive to a balanced presence of positive and negative
training instances. In our setting, links over some particular in-
tent (filter) could easily fall into one of two extreme cases where
most of them are positive (intent is vague) or most of them are
negative (intent is specific). So we carefully sample links balanced
between positive and negative labels, and among intents (filters).
Sampling and balancing led to a training set consisting of 105,108
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Figure 5: Detailed results for the typed-tree instantiation
links, (63,168 negative and 41,940 positive), and a testing set con-
sisting of 43,680 links (29,260 negative and 14,420 positive). Note
that the testing set is comprised solely of may links.
5.2 Results
Q1: Accuracy To measure the predictive power of our four instan-
tiations, we use a number standard metrics:
• F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall, which gives
a balanced measure of a predictor’s false-negative and false-
positive rates. When computing F1, the model output is rounded
to get a 0/1 label. A value of 1 indicates perfect precision/recall.
• Receiver operating characteristic (roc) curve plots the true-positive
rate against the false-positive rate. It represents a binary classi-
fier’s diagnostic performance at different discrimination thresh-
olds. A perfect model has an area under the curve (auc) of 1.
• Kruskal’s γ is used to measure the correlation between the rank-
ing computed by our model and the ground truth on may links,
which is useful in our setting as in practice we would use com-
puted probabilities to rank may links in order of likelihood to
present them to the user for investigation. A value of 1 indicates
perfect correlation between computed ranking and ground truth.
The metrics for each instantiation are summarized in Table 4. In
addition to the aforementioned metrics, we include the number of
trainable parameters, indicating the fitting power (lower is better);
inference time (time to evaluate one instance); entropy of predicted
probabilities yˆ, indicating the power of triaging links (lower is
better); probability of true positives within links with high predicted
values Pr(y = 1 | yˆ > 0.95) (higher is better); and portion of links
with such high predicted values Pr(yˆ > 0.95) (higher is better).
We observe that the best instantiation is typed-tree. Note, how-
ever, that using Tree-lstm involves the largest number of trainable
parameters. With the fewest trainable parameters and fastest run-
ning time, the str-cnn model achieves the highest true-positive
rate within the most highly ranked links. The str-rnn model is
worse than others in almost all aspects, suggesting that the rnn
string encoder struggles to capture useful patterns from intents
(filters). Our results show that more complex models, specifically
those that use more parameters or encode more structure, tend
to perform slightly better. While simple models are good enough,
more complex models may still lend significant advantage when we
consider market-scale analysis: link inference has to run on millions of
links and even small differences (e.g. a false positive rate difference of
just 0.49% between our two best models, typed-tree and typed-simple)
would translate to thousands of mislabeled links.
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Table 4: Summary of model evaluations
Instantiation # Parameters Inference time (µs/link) Testing γ Testing F1 auc Entropy of yˆ Pr(y = 1 | yˆ > 0.95) Pr(yˆ > 0.95)
str-rnn 154,657 2220 0.970 0.891 0.975 3.002 0.980 0.089
str-cnn 27,409 57 0.988 0.917 0.988 2.534 0.998 0.139
typed-simple 142,417 157 0.989 0.920 0.988 2.399 0.996 0.173
typed-tree 634,881 171 0.992 0.931 0.991 2.220 0.994 0.200
Figure 5a shows the roc curve over the testing dataset for the
typed-tree model. Figure 5b shows the distribution of the predicted
probabilities of the existence of a link, and the probability of a
link actually existing given the predicted probability. The curve
depicting the conditional probability would ideally follow y = x
line. Therefore, the model’s prediction value is highly correlated
to the true probability of being a positive, which confirms with
the high γ value we observed. A higher value at the upper right
of the conditional probability curve suggests links highly ranked
(yˆ > 0.95) by our models are highly likely actual positives. This is
particularly important in saving the effort of humans involved in
investigating links.
Compared to primo [33], our evaluation is over a set of may links
only. This is a strictly more difficult setting than primo’s, which
evaluated over all links containing any imprecision—so some of
the links are actually must links. In particular, if a link is must not
exist, a partially imprecise version will also mostly bemust not exist.
For example, a(.*)c does not match xyz. Despite working in a more
challenging setting, our best instantiations are still able to achieve a
Kruskal’s γ value (0.988 − 0.992) higher than primo (0.971) (In fact,
if we use the same setting as primo, our Kruskal’s γ reaches 0.999.)
Q2: Efficiency Regarding running time, all our instantiations,
except str-rnn, are efficient. As shown in Table 4, they take no
more than 171µs per link for inference. The training time is pro-
portional to inference time. The three best instantiations take no
more than 20min to finish 10 epochs of training. We consider this
particularly fast, given that we used only average hardware and
deep-neural-network training often lasts several hours or days for
many problems. The only exception is str-rnn, which is about 13
times slower than the slowest of the other three, mainly because of
the inefficient unrolling of rnn units over long input strings.
The storage costs or the model size can be measured in the
number of trainable parameters. As shown in Table 4, the largest
model (typed-tree) consists of about 634K parameters, taking up 5.6
MB on disk; the smallest model (string-cnn) consists of only about
27K parameters, taking up merely 300KB on disk. In summary, even
the most complex model does not have significant storage cost.
Threats to Validity We see two threats to validity of our evalu-
ation. First, to generate labeled may links for testing, we synthet-
ically instilled imprecision, following the methodology espoused
by primo, enabling a head-to-head comparison with primo. While
the synthetic imprecision follows the empirical imprecision distri-
bution, we could imagine that actual may links only exhibit rare,
pathological imprecisions. While we cannot discount this possibil-
ity, we believe it is unlikely. The ultimate test of our approach is in
improving the efficacy of client analyses such as IccTA [27] and we
intend to investigate the impact of client analyses in future work.
Second, with neural networks, it is often unclear whether they
are capturing relevant features or simply getting lucky. To address
this threat, we next perform an interpretability investigation.
6 INTERPRETABILITY INVESTIGATION
We now investigate whether our models are learning the right
things and not basing predictions on extraneous artifacts in the
data. An informal way to frame this concern is whether the model’s
predictions align with human intuition. This is directly associated
with the trust we can place on the model and its predictions [40].
Our efforts towards interpretability are multifold:
• We analyzed the incorrect classifications to understand the rea-
sons for incorrectness. Our analysis indicates that the reasons for
incorrectness are understandable and intuitively explained. (§6.1)
• We analyze several instances to understand what parts of input
are important for the predictions. Results show that the model is
taking expected parts of the inputs into account. (§6.2)
• We studied activations of various kernels inside the neural networks
to see which inputs activated them the most. Our findings show
several recognizable strings, which intuitively should have a high
influence on classification, to be activating the kernels. (§6.3)
• We used t-SNE visualizations [31] to understand how a model
groups similar inputs and what features it may be using. We found
several important patterns, boosting our trust in the model. (§6.4)
Interpreting and explaining predictions of a ML-algorithm is a
challenging problem and in fact a topic of active research [18, 45].
Our study in this section is thus a best-effort analysis.
6.1 Error Inspection
We present anecdotal insights from our investigation of erroneous
classification in the typed-simple model. A number of misclassifi-
cations appear where the action or category fields are completely
imprecise (e.g., action string is (.*)) or too imprecise to make
meaningful deductions. The model unsurprisingly has difficulty in
classifying such cases.
There are also, albeit fewer, misclassified instances for near-
certain matches. Examples include android.intent.action.VIEW
matching against android.intent.action(.*)EW and android.i
ntent.action.GET_C(.*)NTENT matching against android.inten
t.action.GET_CONTENT (as part of intents and filters). Such misses
may be due to imprecision preventing encoders from detecting
characteristic patterns (e.g. (.*)EW is seemingly very different from
VIEW). Finally, Our model predicts a matches for different but very
similar strings. For example, consider com.andromo.dev48329.a
pp53751.intent.action.FEED_STAR(.*)ING and com.andromo.d
(.*)9.app135352.intent.action.FEED_STARTING. The two look
similar but have different digits We explore this case more in § 6.4.
{"action": "NULL-CONSTANT", "categories": null} 
{"actions": ["NULL-CONSTANTPOP_DIALOG", "NULL-CONSTANTPUSH_DIALOG_(.*)", 
"(.*)REPLACE_DIALOG_(.*)", "APP-00489869YB964702HUPDATE_VIEW"], "categories": 
null} 
 
{"action": "NULL-CONSTANTREPLACE_DIALOG_(.*)", "categories": null} 
{"actions": ["(.*).CLOSE"], "categories": null} 
 
{"action": "(.*)", "categories": null} 
{"actions": ["android.media.RINGER_MODE_CHANGED", 
"sakurasoft.action.ALWAYS_LOCK", "android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED"], 
"categories": null} 
 
{"action": "(.*)LOGIN_SUCCESS", "categories": null} 
{"actions": ["NULL-CONSTANTLOGIN_FAIL", "NULL-
CONSTANTCREATE_PAYMENT_SUCCESS", "(.*)FATAL_ERROR", 
"(.*)CREATE_PAYMENT_FAIL", "NULL-CONSTANTLOGIN_SUCCESS"], "categories": null} 
 
{"action": "APP-00489869YB964702HREPLACE_DIALOG_(.*)", "categories": null} 
{"actions": ["APP-00489869YB964702HLOGIN_FAIL", "APP-
00489869YB964702HCREATE_PAYMENT_FAIL", "NULL-CONSTANTCREATE_PAYMENT_SUCCESS", 
"(.*)FATAL_ERROR", "NULL-CONSTANTLOGIN_SUCCESS"], "categories": null} 
 
{"action": "com.joboevan.push.message.(.*)", "categories": null} 
{"actions": ["com.joboevan.push.message.NULL-CONSTANT"], "categories": null} 
 
{"action": "", "categories": ["(.*)"]} 
{"actions": ["com.dreamware.Hells_Kitchen.CONCORRENTE"], "categories": 
["android.intent.category.DEFAULT"]} 
 
{"action": "(.*)", "categories": null} 
{"actions": ["android.intent.action.MEDIA_BUTTON", 
"com.ez.addon.MUSIC_COMMAND", "android.media.AUDIO_BECOMING_NOISY"], 
"categories": null} 
Figure 6: Explaining individual instances
Overall, our model is able to extract and generalize useful pat-
terns. However, it probably has less grasp on the exact meaning of
(.*), so there are failures to identify some highly probable matches.
6.2 Explaining Individual Instances
We would like to explain predictions on individual instances. Our
approach is similar to that of the popular system lime [40]: we
perturb the given instance and study change in prediction of the
model, treated as a black box, due to the perturbation. In this way,
we can “explain” the prediction on the given instance. We used
the str-cnn instantiation and perturbed the string representation
of the given intent while keeping the filter string constant. Our
perturbation technique is to mask (delete) a substring from the
string. We perform this perturbation at all locations of the string.
Using a mask length of 5, the examples in Figure 6 show intents and
filters with a heat map overlaid on the intents while keeping the
filters uncolored. All the instances selected here have positive link
predictions (it is unlikely to perturb a negatively predicted link to
result in a positive prediction). The redder regions indicate a signif-
icant difference in prediction when masking around those regions,
thus indicating that the regions are important for the predictions.
The examples generally show red regions in the action and cat-
egories values, which implies that those values are important for
the prediction. Thus, the model is generally making good deci-
sions about what is important. There are a couple of outliers. First,
the second instance does not have the action field reddened. This
is probably because there is no direct match between the action
strings in the intent and filter and it may just be the case that the
model was learnt from similar examples in the training set. The
other outlier is the third-last example: we believe that masking
any small part of the action still leaves enough useful information,
which the model can pick up to make a positive prediction. Overall,
these examples give us confidence that the model has acquired a
reasonably correct understanding of intent resolution.
6.3 Studying Kernel Activations
We tested input strings on the str-cnn instantiation to find if the
cnn kernels are picking up patterns relevant to icc link inference.
We went over all intent strings in our dataset and for each cnn
Table 5: Some cnn kernels and their top stimuli
conv1d_size5:14 conv1d_size5:3 conv1d_size7:0
segment activation segment activation segment activation
(.*)R 1.951 null} 3.796 TAVIEWA 3.704
(.*)u 1.894 null, 2.822 n.VIEW" 3.543
(.*)t 1.893 sulle 2.488 y.VIEW" 3.384
(a) android.intent.* (b) Imprecise VIEW actions
(c) dev*.app*.*.FEED* (d) DEFAULT, total imprecise
and null categories
Figure 7: Intent encodings visualized using t-SNE
kernel, looked for string segments that activate the kernel the most.
Some representative kernels and their top activating segments are
shown in Table 5. Important segments are noticeable. For exam-
ple, kernel conv1d_size5:14 gets activated on (.*), and kernel
conv1d_size7:0 gets activated on VIEW. Kernel conv1d_size5:3 is
interesting, as it seems to capture null, an important special value,
but also captures sulle. This indicates a single kernel on its own
may not be so careful at distinguishing useful vs. less useful but sim-
ilar looking segments. Apart from such easily interpretable cases,
many other activations appear for seemingly meaningless strings.
It is likely that in combination, they help capture subtle context,
and when combined in later layers, generate useful encodings.
6.4 Visualization of Encodings
We present a visualization to discover interesting patterns in en-
codings. In the interest of space, we only discuss intent encodings
for the typed-simple instantiation. We use t-SNE [31], a non-linear
dimensionality reduction technique frequently used for visualizing
high-dimensional data in two or three dimensions. The key aspect
of the technique is that similar objects are mapped to nearby points
while dissimilar objects are mapped to distant points. Figure 7
shows the encodings for all intents in the training set (sub-figures
highlight different areas). The size of each point reflects the number
of intents sharing the same combination of values.
Figure 7a highlights the intents for which the action starts with
android.intent. The top cluster is associated with category andr
oid.intent.category.DEFAULT and the bottom is associated with
null categories. A few different actions comprise the top cluster,
e.g., android.intent.action.VIEW, android.intent.action.SEN
D, and imprecise versions of these actions. Figure 7b zooms in on the
top cluster to show six imprecise versions of the VIEW action: one top
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circle containing android.inte(.*).VIEW; three circles containing
android.intent(.*)n.VIEW, android.intent.(.*)n.VIEW, and an-
droid.intent(.*).VIEW; and two lower-figure circles containing
an(.*)ction.VIEW and a(.*)action.VIEW. We can thus see the
level of imprecision reflected spatially, while the semantic common-
ality is still well preserved as the points are all close to the big circle
of the precise value.
Figure 7c highlights actions whose last part starts with FEED. The
prefixes are largely different but share the pattern of dev*.app*,
where * are strings of digits. Our model is thus able to extract the
common pattern and generate similar encodings for these intents.
The last example is the effect of three important values of the
categories field: {android.intent.category.DEFAULT}, total im-
precision {(.*)}, and { }. In Figure 7d, we highlight three encodings
with the VIEW action and the above categories. The encoding for
that of { } (bottom circle) is separated from the other two (top circle).
This conforms with the fact that total imprecision is the impre-
cise version of some concrete value, which is most likely DEFAULT,
rather than the absence of the value for the categories field, which
means ignoring the field during resolution. Our observations sug-
gest that our intent encoder is able to automatically learn semantic
(as opposed to merely syntactic) artifacts.
7 RELATEDWORK
Android Analysis The early ComDroid system [8] inferred sub-
sets of icc values using simple, ad hoc static analysis. Epicc [36]
constructed a more detailed model of icc. ic3 [35] and Bosu et al.
[7] improved on Epicc by using better constant propagation. These
static-analysis techniques inevitably overapproximate the set of
possible icc values and can thus potentially benefit from our work.
primo [33] was the first to formalize the icc link resolution process.
We have compared with primo in Sections 1 and 5.
icc security studies range from information-flow analysis [7, 15,
23, 27, 44] to vulnerability detection [5, 13, 28, 30]. These works do
not perform a formal icc analysis and are instead consumers of icc
analysis and can potentially benefit from our work.
Static Analysis Alarms Z-Ranking [25] uses a simple counting
technique to go through analysis alarms and rank them. Since bugs
are rare, if the analysis results are mostly safe, but then an error is
reported, then it is likely an error. Tripp et al. [43] train a classifier
usingmanually supplied labels and feature extraction of static analy-
sis results. We utilize static analysis to automatically do the labeling,
and perform feature extraction automatically from abstract values.
Koc et al. [24] use manually labeled data and neural networks to
learn code patterns where static analysis loses precision. Our work
uses automatically generated must labels, and since errors (links)
are not localized in one line or even application, we cannot pinpoint
specific code locations for training. Merlin [29] infers probabilistic
information-flow specifications from code and then applies them to
discover bugs; similar approaches were also proposed by Kremenek
et al. [26] and Murali et al. [32]. We instead augment static analysis
with a post-processing step to assign probabilities to alarms.
Another class of methods uses logical techniques to suppress
false alarms, e.g., using abduction [10] or predicate abstraction [6].
ML for Programs There is a plethora of works applying forms
of machine learning to “big code”—see Allamanis et al. [2] for a
comprehensive survey. We compare with most related works.
Related to tdes, Parisotto et al. [37] introduced a tree-structured
neural network to encode abstract-syntax trees for program syn-
thesis. tdes can potentially be extended in that direction to reason
about recursive data types. Allamanis et al. [4] use cnns to generate
summaries of code. Here, we used cnns to encode list data types.
Allamanis et al. [3] present neural networks that encode and
check semantic equivalence of two symbolic formulas. The task is
more strict than link inference. For our case, simple instantiations
work reasonably well. It is also prohibitive to generate all possible
intents or filters as they did for Boolean formulas.
Hellendoorn and Devanbu [19] proposed modeling techniques
for source code understanding, which they test with n-grams and
rnns. Gu et al. [17] use deep learning to generate api sequences for
a natural language query (e.g., parse xml, or play audio). Instead of
using deep learning for code understanding, we use it to classify
imprecise results of static analysis for inter component communi-
cation. Raychev et al. [39] use rnns for code completion and other
techniques for predicting variable names and types [38].
8 CONCLUSIONS
We tackled the problem of false positives in static analysis of An-
droid communication links. We augment a static analysis with a
post-processing step that estimates the probability with which a
link is indeed a true positive. To facilitate machine learning in our
setting, we propose a custom neural-network architecture target-
ing the link-inference problem. The key novelty is type-directed
encoders (tde), a framework for composing neural networks that
take elements of some type τ and encodes them into real-valued
vectors. We believe that this technique can be applicable to a wide
variety of problems in the context of machine-learning applied
to programming-languages problems. In the future, we want to
explore this intriguing idea in other contexts.
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